Introduction
A century has elapsed since Max Weber delivered two lectures at the University of Munich that continue to figure prominently in assessments of his oeuvre and more generally in the methodology and philosophy of the social sciences. 1 In November, 1917, in "Science as a Vocation" (Wissenschaft als Beruf), Weber affirmed the sociologist's duty to keep his values and his politics separate from his scientific practice. Professors should not preach to their students. The task of the social scientist was to construct ideal types that could be explored empirically and thereby contribute to causal explanations of social phenomena whose validity would have to be accepted on grounds of logic and empirical verification by all and sundry, independently of values. Even if the challenge was harder than that facing the natural scientist, since human subjectivities (beliefs and values) were among the main variables to be investigated, the scientific method was common to both. In "Politics as a
Vocation" (Politik als Beruf), delivered in January, 1919, Weber's main subject is the tension inherent in a democracy between the emotional skills on which the politician depends to obtain power, and the need of the modern professional politician (Berufspolitiker) to practice stringent rationality in order to be effective in office. The two "vocation essays," as they have come to be known, range widely over core themes of Weber's sociology, including definitions of the state, bureaucracy, and legitimate domination. Scholars have interpreted the texts in the light of Weber's biography and the values he held personally, and also against the background of military defeat and political revolution in Germany. Weber died in 1920, and his interpreters have probed the consistency of these late lectures with his voluminous earlier 2 writings. Some have questioned whether the two essays are compatible with each other. Does not Weber betray, when implying in 1919 an enthusiasm for strong charismatic leadership, the impossibility of the "value-free" (wertfrei) social science for which he had pleaded just fifteen months earlier?
This essay is divided into three parts. In the first I consider the main charges leveled against Weber and the attempts to answer them, notably that of British sociologist W. G. In this vein, Runciman has argued eloquently in a recent review essay in defense of the wertfrei Weberian methodology, which sets out to explain social phenomena by means of the construction of ideal types that include subjective or "psychological" variables. 7 The most famous such argument is the one that traces the expansion of industrial capitalism to religious "inner-worldly asceticism," exemplified by Calvinism. Christianity, but in Europe its creative potential was being stymied by new political trends.
Hence the inspiration Weber drew from the US. He constructed his most influential ideal type on this highly subjective basis. 9 Aligned to this construction of das Abendland, two further issues deserve attention.
They can be glossed as idealism and individualism. Let us take the former first. Here Weber's approach reflects the main strands of German philosophy in the Enlightenment and counter- The First Eurasian Age
All attempts to impose order on the past through historical periodization are open to contestation. Historians conventionally restrict themselves to the eras for which they possess written source materials, but it is of course possible to reach further back. David Christian begins his "big history" of the planet 13.8 billion years ago, with the Big Bang: the past can hardly be writ larger than this. 12 In the book mentioned above, Jared Diamond reaches back a modest 13,000 years to the end of the PalaeolithicPaleolithic. 13 If one is interested in the emergence of large-scale social organization, highly differentiated in terms of culture as well as the division of labor, a very strong case can be made for opening the narrative not with the Neolithic revolution but significantly later, with the emergence of cities in the Bronze Age.
14 Civilizations have emerged and flourished independently in several parts of the world, but those of Eurasia have a strong claim on our attention due to their longevity and the intensifying connectivity that eventually draws them into a single system (even though parallel evolution remains significant long after contacts are established). By Eurasia I mean all those parts of Europe and Asia, plus those parts of North and East Africa that were integrated into this world system, in the centuries preceding the Common Era. 15 (Needless to say this particular temporal demarcation is no less arbitrary than the distinction between "continents," which we have inherited from the ancient Greeks.)
The long-term contrast between this Eurasia and the rest of the planet can be explored in various domains. One, of interest primarily to anthropologists, is that of domestic institutions: marriage, the family, and kinship. Jack Goody constructed pioneering ideal types of Eurasia and sub-Saharan Africa in order to demonstrate that the differences between domestic institutions were based ultimately on differences in production systems, and on modes of holding and transmitting property. 16 Only in the urbanizing societies of Eurasia were conditions conducive to the emergence of proto-bourgeois cultures of distinction.
Literacy enabled systematization and cumulative advances in scientific knowledge, which in Having illuminated the contrast between Eurasia and sub-Saharan Africa at a very macro level, in later decades Goody turned his attention to the significance of differences within the Eurasian landmass. Max Weber was one of his prime examples for Eurocentric bias. 17 Weber's key concept of rationalization, exemplified in double entry bookkeeping, was
shown by Goody to be just as applicable to East Asia as to Europe. Nor is Goody at all impressed by Weber's focus on religion as a causal factor: rather, in his understanding, doctrines and churches expand alongside commerce within and between civilizations, and there are no grounds for privileging Western or, even more narrowly, Protestant Christianity.
Goody does not deny the importance of the European scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, nor of the industrial revolution that followed a century later, nor the links between the two. But he places these momentous developments in the context of long-term developments across the landmass. Only in the nineteenth century did the gap between East and West widen dramatically, in the course of a "great divergence" brought about by a combination of the new industries, technologies, and military might of the Western powers. 18 As we can now recognize with the rise of the Asian economies in the twenty-first century, even this period of emphatic Western advantage has turned out to be temporary.
I think Goody goes too far in his dismissal of religion as a prime factor in the evolution of Eurasia. He is surely right to play down the significance of the Protestant Reformation. Even Weber sometimes conceded that this was a product of a long-run dynamic in Western Christianity (which Weber perceived to be a different Kulturwelt from the stagnant mysticism that he believed to be intrinsic to the Eastern Christian traditions). Weber also drew attention to the "this-worldly" concerns of the Confucian tradition, so different from the soteriology of Buddhism, which in this respect was closer to all three of the 20 This theory has been much refined but remains controversial. 21 It was not addressed by Goody, but I think it can be grafted onto his account, which gives priority to an earlier material revolution in the cities. This welding of political economy and cosmology constitutes a frame for later developments. Opening the narrative of modernity some three millennia ago, in multiple civilizational traditions across Eurasia, is preferable, from this perspective, to selecting particular moments of rupture in particular places (such as the Weberian thesis about Protestantism in the West) as the decisive cause of a global modernity.
Axial notions of transcendence had secular economic and sociopolitical correlates.
Whereas Jaspers's philosophy of history paid little attention to these, it can be extended to encompass a dialectical relationship between the expansion of market economy and 11 redistribution by the state, which that is rendered increasingly accountable to its subjects and attentive to their social entitlements as well as to legal and political rights. 22 The most The rival "interface" conception of Eurasia is of interest for a number of reasons.
Some readers of this journal may be impressed by the fact that it was largely the invention of gifted humanities scholars-linguists, geographers, historians, theologians, and others-in the Russian diaspora in Western and central Europe in the decades following the Bolshevik revolution. 24 These scholars had lost their country to the socialists and needed to work out a new identity (and ideology) for themselves and their homeland. They did so by celebrating the expansive imperial power that had conquered most of northern and central Asia in recent centuries. The Russian Eurasianists highlighted the superior moral (often mystical) qualities of Russia, in contrast to the soulless rationality of the West. Their concept of Eurasia drew on 13 a long history of intellectual ambivalence toward the economically more developed West. In its essentials, this ambivalence resembled earlier German reactions to the French enlightenment. 25 The natural reaction of the marginalized to assertions of universal reason by a dominant power was to assert the primacy of Kultur over Zivilisation. As in Germany, in Russia, too, the spirit of the nation (narod) was taken to be the fundamental source of value.
Unlike Germany, the Russians had acquired a vast empire stretching from the eastern inclusion that was launched in the first Eurasian Age. 30 We need a second Eurasian Age to counter the threat posed by the present hegemon.
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